

1 JUDGE KHAN:

2 Mr. Witness, it's just a suggestion put to you. If you agree, say, "Yes, I agree." If you don't, just say
3 you don't agree, it's false, it's false, and move on.

4 THE WITNESS:

5 I'm sorry, because I felt that I was compelled to say what I have already said, and the answer is no.

6 BY MR. MORLEY:

7 Q. And as part of that suggestion, it is said that you were helping and influential with the *Interahamwe* at
8 various roadblocks to which you delivered weapons on the 10th of April of 1994. Now, do you
9 understand the suggestion; although, I expect you will deny the truth of it?

10 A. No. The first answer includes the second answer, and it is still no.

11 Q. Do you know Jean Kambanda?

12 A. Yes, I know him.

13 Q. Was he somebody you knew in 1994?

14 A. Frankly speaking, no.

15 Q. He was the prime minister of the Abatabazi government; that's right, isn't it?

16 A. That is correct. I saw him at the meeting of prefects with government members on the
17 11th of April 1994, if my memory serves me well. Thank you.

18 Q. You are aware that he has pleaded guilty to genocide and received a life sentence, yes?

19 A. Yes, I read documents, so yes.

20 Q. In principle, would you agree that the prime minister of the country had a reasonably good overview as
21 to what was going on?

22 A. You see, I'm not here to answer in his place. I don't know what he said during his trial.

23 MADAM PRESIDENT:

24 Move on, Mr. Morley.

25 BY MR. MORLEY:

26 Q. Would it surprise you if I was to tell you that Jean Kambanda described you as being very influential
27 over the *Interahamwe* in Kigali?

28 A. That's his statement and it does not bind me.

29 Q. Do you deny being influential over the *Interahamwe*?

30 A. Totally.

31 MADAM PRESIDENT:

32 And now a pause.

33 BY MR. MORLEY:

34 Q. When giving your evidence two days ago, you told us that on the 7th of April you went to a meeting of
35 army officers at 10 past 10 in the morning of the 7th of April at, I think, the *École supérieure militaire*; is
36 that right?

37 A. That is correct.

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EXHIBIT No: P 474 (B)
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TENDERED BY: PROSECUTOR
NAME OF WITNESS: THARCISSE
RENZATO
(DWNZ33)

1 Q. You are also an army officer; that's right, isn't it?

2 A. Here, maybe I have to answer you at length, in detail. I -- yes, I'm an army officer. I've been an army
3 officer, but since 1994 -- or between 1990 and 1994, I have not really discharged any duties within the
4 armed forces.

5 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

6 Mr. Witness, you were commissioned, correct?

7 THE WITNESS:

8 That is correct.

9 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

10 Has that commission been taken back?

11 THE WITNESS:

12 I have not been decommissioned, from what I know.

13 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

14 Thank you.

15 BY MR. MORLEY:

16 Q. Senior members of the army were present at that meeting; do you agree?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. It is suggested that members of the Presidential Guard on the 7th of April of 1994 went around various
19 homes of moderate Hutu opposition figures and murdered them and their whole families. Do you know
20 anything about that?

21 A. Once again, I don't think that this is based on any established investigation, as such, because on the
22 7th of April war had already started. War started on the night of the 6th to the 7th of April 1994.

23 Q. The army having convened, the top brass being together, you being present with them, there being 50
24 or so military men in the room in the *École supérieure militaire*, what was the point of the meeting, given
25 what happened later?

26 A. The object of the meeting was, first, information regarding what had happened on the night of the 6th to
27 the 7th. Secondly, subsequent to the major crisis in which the country had been plunged, participants
28 at the meeting considered what had to be done in order to re-establish order and security. I remember
29 that I spoke on that question, and in the minutes of that meeting, I talked about the main decisions
30 taken during the meeting, and I think that, actually, the conclusions of the meeting were really noble.

31

32 Now, to judge that situation at such late date and attribute to the meeting what you're saying is very
33 serious, because the meeting rose at 2:30 in the afternoon, if I'm not wrong, and already the town was
34 in flame or in turmoil. The RPF offensive was under way officially. Good resolutions which had been
35 taken at the meeting were never implemented due to shortage of time -- due to lack of time. So the
36 response to the question is lack of time to implement the good resolutions which had been taken at the
37 meeting of the officers at the *École supérieure militaire*, that is, the military academy. But do not think

1 that meeting had been organised for a criminal objective. No, that was not it. Thank you.

2 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

3 Did -- that meeting, did it say anything concerning the killing of the prime minister?

4 THE WITNESS:

5 Not at all.

6 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

7 It was quiet and silent on the fact that the prime minister had been killed?

8 THE WITNESS:

9 I was at the meeting. I think that the issue was raised after the break, at around 11. When the officers
10 came back to the meeting in the conference room, we spoke about that issue because that was new
11 information; it was news. But otherwise, throughout the meeting, that matter was not really dealt with.

12

13 And I said -- I beg your pardon. Last time I testified that participants at the meeting were -- could hear
14 explosions from the Kigali camp. Everyone was worried. Everybody was worried and we were
15 wondering what was happening. So participants at the meeting did not have any information regarding
16 the prime minister's death, as such. Thank you.

17 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

18 Did anyone suggest to phone up the prime minister and ask her if she could convene her government
19 and take some decisions?

20 THE WITNESS:

21 Your Honour, you're asking me a question which is quite difficult, because I was there as a participant
22 and I explained how I went to the meeting, in what capacity. I think that on the previous day there had
23 been a meeting at the general staff or headquarters of the Rwandan armed forces, and now to say that
24 at this point or that point in time we did this or that about the prime minister, in officers' ethics -- code of
25 ethics the normal procedure does not -- normally, I don't know whether they talk about calling the
26 prime minister in order to continue dealing with affairs of the state. I haven't seen this anywhere in the
27 code of ethics of the military.

28 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

29 I'm merely asking whether it happened, whether somebody remembered -- if, as you suggest, nobody
30 knew that the prime minister had been killed and nobody knew that the other people had been killed,
31 whether any one of them said, "Now, what are we doing here talking about government? There is a
32 government, by the prime minister, she should immediately summon." Did anyone refer to that or did
33 anyone come in and say, "Look, the prime minister was also killed. We don't have a prime minister.
34 We don't have a president. We have a vacuum. We have got to deal with a vacuum," something like
35 that? I'm trying to find out what were the state of knowledge of those who were participating in the
36 meeting and what it is they intended to do, the nobility of the -- of the resolutions that you said were
37 noble but not implemented.

1 THE WITNESS:

2 I think that with regard to the participants, the major issue was getting control of the security situation,
3 one. The first thing that we noticed was that Kigali, under the agreement which had been reached, was
4 not really functioning smoothly. The presence of the armed forces in neighbourhoods was not visible.
5 The situation was worsening by the minute. Maybe we had to take control of the situation and see how
6 we could act. We had strict instructions to comply with, and things were not easy.

7

8 Given the fact that everyone was speaking out against the killings and the uncontrollable acts, it was
9 obvious and clear that at the end of the meeting people were asked to go and take their units and take
10 the necessary measures and do everything that they could do in order to bring the situation under
11 control as soon as possible.

12

13 So I am saying that the main issue of the meeting was to restore security in Kigali, to control the
14 situation which was worsening by the minute, as I've already said. Maybe I did not hear clearly, but
15 personally, I did not hear anything in that regard, Your Honour. I don't know whether others spoke
16 about it, but I don't want to say more regarding -- I mean, on top of what I've just said.

17 JUDGE MUTHOGA:

18 Continue.

19 BY MR. MORLEY:

20 Q. Learning at around 11:00 that the prime minister had been murdered, and I suggest it is well known she
21 was murdered by members of the Presidential Guard, soldiers, you're all soldiers in a room, what was
22 said about that?

23 A. I don't know whether I should answer you as the person in charge of the town of Kigali, but I do have an
24 answer to give you in that capacity. Firstly, all high personalities of the republic, especially of the
25 opposition, had obtained special protection from UNAMIR, and they had guards at their home. And a
26 company of republican guards from the gendarmerie had been set up that had the mission to protect all
27 these senior officials and to accompany men -- accompany them in their movements and ensure their
28 safety.

29

30 These soldiers were, of course, positioned in different locations, and what I know, what I learnt,
31 because we did conduct investigations at a later stage, was that when you talk about the
32 Presidential Guard, those soldiers never fought against any of those senior officials. They did not force
33 the gate open. These things should be known. And measures would have been taken.

34

35 Now, as far as the Presidential Guard is concerned, I was not in command, and I do not know what
36 happened, but I would like to inform you of what I observed. Firstly, if you -- if you take into account the
37 case of the Presidential Guard in Kacyiru, you were not very far from the headquarters of the RPF that

1 was located in the former parliament building -- national parliament building. And I might be telling you
2 a personal secret here, because I haven't said it before, I, that night, lost a brother. I am not alone. A
3 lot of people died. Those people were attacked directly in the night of the 6th to the 7th.

4
5 So, I would not like to bow to popular belief, saying that that unit would have had the opportunity to go
6 on a manhunt throughout the city. Not only on the night of the 6th to the 7th, but also on the 7th, the
7 8th, et cetera, the Presidential Guard became something horrible known across the world. But I believe
8 that this is somewhat propaganda. I would just like to say that this unit was -- had a specific mission
9 from a military point of view. That is to say, that from that night they were to fight against the RPF.

10

11 And maybe to give you even fuller picture, I believe, after verification, that in the morning at
12 approximately 11 a.m., a large unit of the RPF had moved from the north, I think in the Mukarange
13 region -- it's called a battalion, but I don't accept that term. It wasn't a battalion. A battalion containing
14 eight companies, well, generally that's not acceptable. That's a difficult thing to administer. So, it is a
15 light brigade. So, it left that place and it came to Kigali, and by 11:00 it was in position. And those
16 soldiers joined up with others who were in the CND, and immediately all the important military positions
17 in Kigali came under attack. They were attacked because those units were already under fire on the
18 part of the RPF.

19

20 So, I am not saying that soldiers might have gone out during the night and might have wreaked havoc,
21 but this might answer somewhat or, in fact, contradict what we are in the habit of hearing on the
22 subject.

23 Q. Well, the question was what was said at the meeting about the murder of the prime minister by soldiers.
24 It's a matter for the Bench whether you answered the question.

25

26 What was said at the meeting about the fact that, taken into the army's custody were ten Belgian
27 United Nations peacekeepers, whose bodies were later found at Camp Kigali? Those men had been
28 the bodyguard for the prime minister. Now, you've told us that you learnt at 11:00 she had been
29 murdered. What was said at the meeting about the taking into the army's custody -- you're all army
30 men there -- of the ten Belgian peacekeepers, later murdered?

31 MADAM PRESIDENT:

32 And, Mr. Renzaho, you've told us your view of events. We listened to them. We understand what you
33 have been telling us. But now, please, just answer the question, and be as concise as possible.

34 THE WITNESS:

35 Thank you. I believe that you are referring to the incident of the Belgian Blue Helmets at the military
36 camp in Kigali, are you not? Thank you.

37

1 This incident took place at approximately 11:00 -- was known to have taken place at approximately
2 11 a.m., at approximately the time when the general walked into the room, he arrived somewhat late,
3 and he talked to the people who were hosting the meeting and he said that there were some serious
4 events that were taking place in the military within Kigali.

5 MADAM PRESIDENT:

6 The general in question who came at around 11:00 was General Dallaire.

7 THE WITNESS:

8 Yes.

9 THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:

10 Says the witness.

11 MADAM PRESIDENT:

12 This is for the transcript, please. Mr. Renzaho, speak slowly; otherwise, there will be parts of your
13 answer missing. So try to be -- to answer with a more concise way and slowly.

14 THE WITNESS:

15 Yes, thank you. I shall adhere to that, absolutely.

16

17 So he came into the meeting room and he announced that this event had occurred, and practically at
18 the same time there was an officer who was commanding the military camp in Kigali who came in to
19 say that there was a riot and that they could not quell that riot and that he required assistance. And I
20 believe that we discussed this, but though it was a bit of a sort of turmoil, because the events were so
21 surprising to us, and this was occurring in a situation of tension and insecurity that we had been talking
22 about throughout the meeting. Well, I talked about the explosions, and we wondered what that
23 corresponded to. And that then gave rise to this meeting that did not last very long, and the officers had
24 to go back to their relative units and they left, and those in charge left to go and see what was
25 happening at Kigali military camp. Now, I was not part of that team, and I do not know exactly what
26 happened because I was assigned to another task in the interim.

27 BY MR. MORLEY:

28 Q. The last question on the gathering of the senior officers of the army, it's plain, is it not, that the army
29 was functioning in that everybody was able to gather 50 or so in number at the military school, and after
30 the meeting, all the respective officers went back to their different units, you've told us. And one of the
31 questions which was being discussed, you've told us, was the state of insecurity and how to bring some
32 order to events. Colonel Renzaho, how do you explain, if you have a functioning army which is capable
33 of gathering at 7 -- on the 7th of April at 10:00 in the morning, how so many Tutsi civilians died over so
34 many days at so many roadblocks, none of which were disbanded by that functioning army?

35 A. Mr. Prosecutor, your question is somewhat complex in nature, and I do not know whether I will be able
36 to answer it in its entirety. All I can give you is a mere estimation. Well, I believe that you are providing
37 us with a -- an exorbitant estimation of the capacity of this army, and I am wondering whether one can

1 judge things in such a manner.

2

3 Secondly, I might like to dwell on an aspect which puts what you say into perspective. Now, since the
4 24th of December 1993, we were in the capital and the Arusha -- the accords were in place that
5 regulate the functioning of the units in Kigali.

6 *(Pages 37 to 51 by Sherri Knox)*

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2 THE WITNESS (*continuing*):

3 So this agreement has already been in place for more than three-four months, and it was working and
4 habits had been created. And if any procedure is difficult to change, it is, in fact, a military procedure.
5 If you add to that the international factor, you will understand that it is extremely difficult to make a
6 difference to an agreement of such a nature or change it.

7

8 Now, for Kigali, the forces that were in charge of patrolling the neighbourhoods in conjunction with the
9 gendarmerie unit designated for the purpose, this did not work, and I would go as far as to say that this
10 was the first worry of those officers who came together to meet at the headquarters of the
11 Rwandan army on the night -- on the 6th to the 7th; notably, that we had to organise patrols in all
12 neighbourhoods overnight in order to discourage any sources of disturbance -- and organised public
13 security. This was not done.

14

15 And the other element that I would like to underline is the situation in which the Rwandan forces found
16 themselves during that period after the signing of the Arusha Accords. It is undeniable that the
17 Rwandan armed forces committed themselves to what had been outlined in the Arusha Accords.
18 And, I might not be a specialist in the matter -- I'm sure others will come to say this, but I would like to
19 point out for the information of the Trial Chamber that important points underlied the measures that
20 were taken; notably, that the army started to restore order. There was a mobilization; there was a
21 readjustment of the operational sectors -- taking into account the presence of the international force that
22 was -- had arrived and that was to occupy the terrain. And there was also the fact that these accords
23 had been signed, and the Kigali military camps, including the Kanombe garrison, were under
24 consignment. There we are -- and I thank you.

25 BY MR. MORLEY:

26 Q. Do you say that the army was incompetent?

27 MADAM PRESIDENT:

28 Are you calling for another half an hour's speculation?

29 MR. MORLEY:

30 That one can be answered yes or no -- just as most of my questions can be answered yes or no.

31 MADAM PRESIDENT:

32 So you ask for a yes-or-no answer.

33 BY MR. MORLEY:

34 Q. I just said, are you saying that the army was incompetent?

35 A. I -- I'm obliged not to give yes-or-no answer to this question because, first and foremost, I do not
36 believe that, and I -- I have never been discontented with what I did in the army. And I believe that
37 there are missions that are impossible and there are men to do the job.