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**International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda**

APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Theodor Meron, Presiding
Judge Patrick Robinson
Judge Fausto Pocar
Judge Liu Daqun
Judge Carmel Agius

Registrar: Mr. Adama Dieng

Date filed: 30 April 2012

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

THARCISSE MUVUNYI

Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-R

JUDICIAL RECORDS ARCHIVES
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PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSE

**To "Tharcisse Muvunyi's Motion for Review of
Appeal Judgement of 01 April 2011"**

Office of the Prosecutor

Hassan B. Jallow
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For Tharcisse Muvunyi

Tanoo Mylvaganam

A. THE APPLICATION AND PROSECUTION'S POSITION

(i) Overview

1. On 21 March 2012, Counsel Tanoo Mylvaganam filed, apparently on a *pro bono* basis, a confidential *Accused (sic)*¹ *Tharcisse Muvunyi's Motion for Review of Appeal Judgement of 01 April 2011* ("Request for Review"), pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 120 and 121 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules").²

2. The Prosecution is not aware of Counsel Mylvaganam's standing to appear before the Tribunal for this application, particularly in view of Tharcisse Muvunyi's ("Muvunyi") early release.³ Should the Appeals Chamber deem the Request for Review validly filed, the Prosecution opposes it and submits that it should fail in its entirety for the reasons explained below.⁴

3. Muvunyi requests the Appeals Chamber to admit as new facts three conclusions made in the *Butare* Trial Judgement⁵, specifically that: (1) more than one meeting took place in Gikore during May 1994; (2) the testimony of Prosecution Witness CCS/FAH that Alphonse Nteziryayo's ("Nteziryayo") was, as *Préfet* of Butare, involved in the same meeting attended by Muvunyi at the Gikore Trade Centre, was not credible; and (3) the *Butare* Trial Chamber did not find that Nteziryayo committed the crime of direct and

¹ Muvunyi is no longer an accused and has no case pending before this Tribunal. His conviction and sentence were upheld by the Appeals Chamber. In fact, Muvunyi was granted early release. *Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi*, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-R, *Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi's Application for Early Release*, 6 March 2012 ("*Muvunyi* Decision on Early Release").

² The Request for Review was filed in two parts. The first one bears Registry pages 224/A to 221/A and the second one bears Registry pages 220/A to 201/A.

³ *Muvunyi* Decision on Early Release.

⁴ The Prosecution's response is filed publicly, bearing in mind that all submissions filed before the Tribunal shall be public unless there are exceptional reasons for keeping them confidential.

⁵ *Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al.*, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgement, 24 June 2011, para 4914.

public incitement to commit genocide at that Gikore meeting.⁶ Muvunyi claims that these findings undermine his conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on his presence and utterances at a meeting held at the Gikore Trade Centre in May 1994, as they constitute new facts that could have had a decisive impact in the Appeal Chamber Judgement. Alternatively, he claims that the Appeal Chamber should exceptionally grant his application since ignoring the alleged new facts would result in a miscarriage of justice.⁷

4. Rule 120 of the Rules, as well as the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence, establish clear and cumulative requirements for triggering the exceptional procedure of review of a final judgement. The present Request for Review fails to meet those cumulative requirements. It should be dismissed in its entirety, on a preliminary examination pursuant to Rule 121 of the Rules, for each and all of the following reasons:

- The findings made by the *Butare* Trial Chamber on the basis of its assessment of the entire evidence before it, are not facts *per se*, let alone new facts for the purpose of review under Article 25 of the Statute and Rule 120 of the Rules. Separate Chambers indeed can reach different conclusions on the basis of the same facts, without it rendering either conclusion unreasonable or, more importantly, turning them into new facts warranting review of a final judgement.
- In addition, the findings of the *Butare* Trial Chamber regarding the number of meetings held at the Gikore Trade Centre, the credibility of Prosecution Witness CCS/FAH or the presence and official position of Nteziryayo at the time of the Gikore meeting cannot qualify as new facts warranting review because they are not new *information of an evidentiary nature* supporting a fact that was not in issue during the trial or appeal proceedings. As confirmed by Muvunyi's acknowledgement and his several references to his appeal brief, the Request for Review essentially repeats Muvunyi's unsuccessful contentions made at trial and on

⁶ Request for Review, para. 6.

⁷ Request for Review, paras. 7, 10.

appeal on the same three issues. The Request for Review therefore amounts to a *de novo* appeal, which is impermissible under Rule 120 of the Rules.

- In these circumstances, even if the findings of the *Butare* Trial Chamber were to be considered as new facts, *quid non*, they could not have been a decisive factor in the decision of the Appeals Chamber. Also, Muvunyi fails to show the existence of any exceptional circumstances such that ignoring the alleged new facts would result in a miscarriage of justice.

(ii) Background

5. The Applicant, a former Lieutenant-Colonel in the Rwandan Army based in Butare *Préfecture*, was convicted in the first trial, for genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity; he was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.⁸ The Appeals Chamber reversed these convictions on 29 August 2008 and ordered a retrial, limited to the allegation under Count 3 of the Indictment concerning Muvunyi responsibility for direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on a speech he purportedly gave at the Gikore Trade Centre in Nyaruhengeri Commune, Butare *Préfecture*.⁹

6. Following Muvunyi's retrial, a Trial Chamber convicted him for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, based on his statement at a public meeting held in mid to late May 1994 at the Gikore Trade Centre and sentenced him to 15 years of imprisonment.¹⁰ Muvunyi appealed against these conviction and sentence.¹¹ On 1 April 2011, the Appeals Chamber (Judges Liu and Meron dissenting) upheld both his conviction and the

⁸ *Muvunyi I*, Trial Judgement, 12 September 2006, paras. 531, 545 ("*Muvunyi I*, Trial Judgement").

⁹ *Muvunyi I*, Appeal Judgement, 29 August 2008, paras. 148, 171 ("*Muvunyi I*, Appeal Judgement").

¹⁰ *Muvunyi II*, Trial Judgement, 11 February 2010, paras. 132, 133, 153 ("*Muvunyi II*, Trial Judgement").

¹¹ Muvunyi Appellant's Brief, filed on 31 May 2010, paras. 5, 17, 82.

sentence of 15 years imprisonment.¹² The latter judgement is the proper object of the present Request for Review.

B. SUBMISSIONS

7. An applicant seeking relief pursuant to Rule 120 must demonstrate all of the following: (1) that there is a new fact; (2) that the new fact must not have been known to the moving party at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber; (3) that the lack of discovery of the new fact was not the result of lack of due diligence of the moving party; and (4) that the new fact, if proved, could have been a decisive factor in reaching the original decision.¹³ In “wholly exceptional circumstances” however, a chamber may consider reviewing its decision, despite failure to meet requirements (2) and (3) if “ignoring the new fact would result in a miscarriage of justice.”¹⁴

8. Muvunyi fails to discharge this burden.

(i) The findings of the Butare Trial Chamber do not qualify as new facts within the meaning of Rule 120 of the Rules

9. The differing conclusions reached by the *Butare* Trial Chamber, regarding the number of meetings held at the Gikore Trade Centre, the credibility of witness CCS/FAH and Nteziryayo’s presence and role at the meeting in its capacity as *Préfet*, do not constitute new and material facts warranting the review of the Appeal Chamber’s final judgement under Rule 120 of the Rules.

¹² *Muvunyi II*, Appeal Judgement.

¹³ *Karera v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-01-74-R, Decision on Requests for Review & Assignment of Counsel, 28 February 2011, para. 9; *Niyitegeka v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Fourth Request for Review, 22 April 2009, para. 21 (“*Niyitegeka* Decision on Fourth Request for Review”); *Ndindabahizi v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, 16 January 2007, paras. 32-42.

¹⁴ *Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR99-54A-R, Decision on Request for Review, 25 August 2011, para. 17 (“*Kamuhanda* Decision on Request for Review”).

10. First, a “new fact” for purposes of review consists of “new information of an evidentiary nature of a fact that was not in issue during the trial or appeal proceedings.”¹⁵ Notwithstanding the fact that he frames his allegations in terms of the incompatibility between the “findings of fact” made in the *Butare* case and the Appeals Chamber’s final Judgment,¹⁶ Muvunyi wrongly equates a new fact for purposes of review, with a Chamber’s finding or conclusion based on its discretionary assessment of the entirety of the evidence before it.

11. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “finding” as “a determination by a judge, jury or administrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the record usually presented at trial or hearing.”¹⁷ Conversely, it defines a “fact” as “an actual or alleged event or circumstance, as distinguished from its legal effect, consequence or interpretation”.¹⁸ In light of these definitions, a finding is a determination or conclusion based on a fact and not the fact (event or circumstance) *per se*. A new or different finding therefore does not constitute a “new fact” for the purposes of review proceedings. The Request for Review should be dismissed on this basis alone.

12. Second, the underlying facts forming the basis of the findings of the *Butare* Trial Chamber, regarding the number of meetings at Gikore, the credibility of witness CCS/FAH and the presence of Nteziryayo at the meeting in its capacity as *Préfet*, were all in issue during the *Muvunyi*’s trial and appeal proceedings.¹⁹ They cannot, therefore, be considered as “new

¹⁵ *Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-96-03-R, Decision on Requests for Reconsideration, Review, Assignment of Counsel, Disclosure and Clarification, 8 December 2006, para. 9 (“*Rutaganda* Reconsideration and Review Decision”).

¹⁶ Request for Review, para 11.

¹⁷ Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 646.

¹⁸ Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 610.

¹⁹ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras. 25-26. The Prosecutor recalls that pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute and Rule 120 of the Rules, review is only available with respect to the final judgement in a case. While there are references to the Trial Judgement in this response for ease of reference, any specific arguments relating to the factual findings and legal conclusions therein cannot be considered as subject to review.

facts” within the meaning of Rule 120 of the Rules. Indeed, to be eligible for review, a new fact “must not have been among the deciding factors that the deciding body could have taken into account in reaching its verdict. In fact, the moving party must show that the Chamber did not know about the fact in reaching its decision.”²⁰ In other words, “what is relevant is whether the deciding body knew about the fact or not in arriving at the decision”.²¹ In the present case, the record evinces that both the Trial and Appeal Chambers were privy to and considered all the facts at issue in reaching their decisions.

13. As Muvunyi expressly acknowledges in his Request for Review, the Prosecution disclosed to him the transcripts of CCS/FAH’s testimony in the *Butare* case and he made use of them during his trial.²² Additionally, Muvunyi challenged the date of the meeting²³, as well as the number of meetings²⁴ and the credibility of the witness during the trial and appeal proceedings. In fact, Muvunyi even acknowledges in his Request for Review that the “history of challenges made in respect of the date of the said meeting is well documented through both Trial and Appellate proceedings.”²⁵ This too should be fatal to his application.

14. Furthermore, Muvunyi’s suggestion²⁶ that the Appeals Chamber could be bound by the findings of the *Butare* Trial Chamber and should, therefore, reverse its earlier finding, cannot succeed. In addition to the fact that no pronouncement of a Trial Chamber can be deemed binding to the Appeals Chamber, the *Butare* Judgement results from a separate Chamber’s exercise of its discretion to assess evidence in proceedings against a different accused

²⁰ *Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-96-14-R, Decision on Request for Review, 6 March 2007, para 22.

²¹ *Kamuhanda* Decision on Request for Review, para.18.

²² Request for Review, Registry page 222/A.

²³ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras 22- 26.

²⁴ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras 27-28.

²⁵ Request for Review, Registry page 216/A, para. 4.

²⁶ Request for Review, paras. 10, 35.

person.²⁷ In this regard, each Trial Chamber has full discretion to determine the appropriate weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony of each witness heard in a given case²⁸, on the basis of all the evidence submitted to it. Each Trial Chamber also “has to consider relevant factors on a case-by-case basis [...]. The application of these factors, and the positive or negative impact they may have on the witness’s credibility, varies according to the specific circumstances of each case.”²⁹ Thus, two Chambers can reach two different conclusions on the basis of the same facts. The Appeals Chamber will give due deference to each of the Chambers’ findings of fact, providing that there is no showing, with respect to each finding in each separate case, that they were unreasonable. That is, no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same finding of fact.³⁰

15. In addition, if the Appeals Chamber were to grant Muvunyi’s request by adopting the *Butare* Trial Chamber’s findings, it will be granting it not on the basis of “new facts”, nor even on the basis of “new findings”, but on the basis of a “different finding” of a different Chamber. This result would be contrary to the Appeals Chamber’s deference to Trial Chambers’ discretion in assessing evidence before them, and to the meaning and purposes of new facts under Rule 120 of the Rules.

(ii) Muvunyi’s Request for Review is an impermissible attempt to litigate de novo issues already considered and adjudicated by the Appeals Chamber

16. Again, review is an exceptional procedure and not, as Muvunyi attempts to obtain with this Request for Review, “an opportunity for a party

²⁷ *Rutaganda* Reconsideration and Review Decision, para. 9.

²⁸ *Nahimana et al v. Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 November 2007, para. 194.

²⁹ *Nchamihigo v. The Prosecutor* Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, Appeal Judgement, 18 March 2010, para. 47.

³⁰ *Bagosora and Nsengiyumva v. The Prosecutor*, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Appeal Judgement, 14 December 2011, para. 18.

to re-litigate arguments that failed at trial or on appeal.”³¹ The Request for Review repeats, under the guise of alleged “new facts” or “new evidence”³², the same arguments Muvunyi unsuccessfully advanced before the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in his case. It must fail on this basis too.

17. As shown above and as Muvunyi acknowledges in the Request for Review, the matters at issue were all litigated at trial and on appeal.³³ As regards the allegation that more than one meeting took place at the Gikore Trade Centre, the Trial Chamber noted, *inter alia*, that the defence did not raise during its cross-examination the possibility of more than one meeting in Gikore in May 1994. It assessed the entire evidence and reasonably accepted the Prosecution evidence that Muvunyi attended the one specific meeting held in Gikore in May 1994.³⁴

18. Muvunyi raised the same issue on appeal. The Appeals Chamber then noted that Muvunyi did not present credible evidence to show that other meetings occurred in May 1994 and found that he had not demonstrated on the evidence that “no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that only one meeting took place at the Gikore Trade Centre in May 1994, and [...] that this meeting took place in mid to late May.”³⁵ Hence, the Appeals Chamber upheld the conclusion of the Trial Chamber, which had properly exercised its “duty to weigh the evidence adduced by both parties on this issue.”³⁶

19. Similarly, with respect to the finding of the *Butare* Trial Chamber that CCS/FAH lacked credibility,³⁷ the issue was also litigated in the *Muvunyi*

³¹ *Kamuhanda* Decision on Request for Review, para. 17(); *Niyitegeka* Decision on Fourth Request for Review, para. 21.

³² Request for Review, para 31.

³³ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras 22- 28; Request for Review, Registry page 216/A, para. 4 and Registry page 222/A.

³⁴ *Muvunyi II* Trial Judgement, paras. 60, 61.

³⁵ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, para 28.

³⁶ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, para 28.

³⁷ Request for Review, 20 March 2012 at paras. 10, 11.

case. Muvunyi's contention regarding inconsistencies in CCS/FAH's statement or his alleged lack of credibility were considered and rejected by the Appeals Chamber, which could not identify any error in the Trial Chamber's assessment of the evidence of this witness.³⁸ In particular, while reviewing his challenges based on inconsistencies in Prosecution evidence, including that of CCS/FAH, the Appeals Chamber recalled that minor inconsistencies commonly occur in witness' testimony without rendering the testimony unreliable, and that it is within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate such inconsistencies and to consider whether the evidence as a whole is credible.³⁹

20. In any event, when the issue of a witness' credibility has been extensively litigated and the allegedly new information merely repeats the same core contentions already advanced at trial or on appeal, the proffered fact or material cannot constitute a new fact for purposes of review. The Appeals Chamber has emphasized that "to suggest that testimony not found credible can be rehabilitated by the simple act of subsequent repetition is not a valid argument and cannot substantiate a claim that a Chamber would have assessed the witness' credibility differently at the time the evidence was heard."⁴⁰ This reasoning applies to the extant Request for Review. That the Butare Trial Chamber made a different finding regarding CCS/FAH's credibility - in the separate *Butare* case- does not add more weight to Muvunyi's defence evidence and unsuccessful contentions in his trial and on appeal, that the witness was not credible.

21. In sum, Muvunyi's mere repetition and re-labeling of the same arguments that were rejected at trial and on appeal, render his Request for Review impermissible. The Appeals Chamber should not condone Muvunyi's

³⁸ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, para 23.

³⁹ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras 45, 49.

⁴⁰ *Kamuhanda*, Decision on Request for Review, para. 27.

attempt to rehabilitate the arguments he unsuccessfully raised at trial and on appeal. It should, accordingly, dismiss the application in its entirety.

(iii) The alleged new facts neither could nor would have been a decisive factor in the decision of the Appeals Chamber

22. Even if the findings of the *Butare* Trial Judgement were to be considered as new facts for the purposes of review, Muvunyi makes no demonstration that they could have been a decisive factor in the Appeal Chamber's decision or that ignoring them would result in a miscarriage of justice.⁴¹ Muvunyi essentially claims that the Appeals Chamber ought to have disregarded the totality of CCS/FAH's testimony.⁴² According to him, the *Butare* Trial Chamber's findings could or would have been a decisive factor in reaching the verdict of the Appeals Chamber.⁴³ However, he fails to develop his arguments to demonstrate how those findings, concerning essentially CCS/FAH's testimony, could or would have had any impact in the decisions reached in his case and upheld by the Appeals Chamber.

23. As mentioned above, the underlying facts and issues concerning the *Butare* Trial Chamber's findings were already presented before the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber. Moreover, as the Appeals Chamber noted, the record shows that the Trial Chamber did not base its factual findings concerning the meeting at Gikore Trade Centre and Muvunyi's role on CCS/FAH's testimony only. The Trial Chamber assessed and relied on the testimonies of five Prosecution Witnesses - FBX, CCP, CCS, AMJ, and YAI. In upholding the Trial Chamber's finding, the Appeals Chamber recalled that Trial Chamber "found that these five Prosecution witnesses provided 'convincing, credible, and reliable first-hand testimony concerning the content

⁴¹ *Niyitegeka* Decision on Fourth Request for Review, para. 21.

⁴² Request for Review, para. 18.

⁴³ Request for Review, para10, (page 9)

of Muvunyi's speech at the Gikore meeting', which was both consistent and corroborated."⁴⁴

24. The Appeals Chamber also found that the Trial Judgement "reflects that the Trial Chamber considered matters related to the timing of the meeting, the number of attendees, as well as the authorities present, and found that many of the witnesses were in general agreement on these points"⁴⁵ The Appeals Chamber further held that the purported discrepancies on these issues did not call into question the Trial Chamber's reliance on the fundamental features of the evidence.⁴⁶ Thus, recalling further "that Trial Chambers enjoy broad discretion in choosing which witness testimony to prefer, and in assessing the impact on witness credibility of inconsistencies within or between witnesses' testimonies and prior statements",⁴⁷ the Appeals Chamber found no error in the Trial Chamber's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and its findings relying on the fundamental features of the evidence before it.⁴⁸

25. The *Butare* Trial Chamber's findings, concerning the number of meetings, the credibility of witness CCS/FAH and Nteziryayo's position as *Préfet* at the time of the Gikore meeting, therefore could not have changed the outcome of the final judgement in Muvunyi's case. Additionally, even if they were to be considered as "new facts", which the Prosecution contests, there are no exceptional circumstance under which ignoring the alleged new facts would result in a miscarriage of justice.

⁴⁴ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, para. 33.

⁴⁵ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras. 45.

⁴⁶ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras. 45.

⁴⁷ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, para. 44.


⁴⁸ *Muvunyi II* Appeal Judgement, paras. 45, 47-49.

C. RELIEF SOUGHT

26. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Prosecution respectfully requests the Appeals Chamber to dismiss Muvunyi's Request for Review in its entirety, on a preliminary examination, pursuant to Rule 121 of the Rules.

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Dated and signed this 30th day of April 2012 at Arusha, Tanzania.



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